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The Partisan Politics of Antiwar Legislation
in Congress, 2001-2011
Michael T. Heaneyt

The United States Constitution grants Congress the power
to declare war and to extend all appropriations for the conduct of
war, but designates the president as the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces.' In requiring Congress and the president to
share war-making powers, the framers of the Constitution intended to balance decision making on questions of war and to
limit abuses of these powers. 2 Despite the balance envisioned by
the framers, in practice, the president enjoys distinct advantages
over Congress in the conduct of war. Most importantly, the president possesses superior information about threats to the United
States, especially prior to the engagement of US forces. Given
their relatively limited access to information, members of Congress are hesitant to challenge the president's judgment about
potential threats. 3 Once troops are engaged in a conflict, efforts
by Congress to oppose the president are likely to be met by
charges that Congress has failed to "support the troops." Although the War Powers Resolution of 1973 attempts to bring the
president's power into check, the resolution's practical effect has
been to create a kind of "stage management" that limits the duration of conflicts, rather than stopping the president from initiating the use of force.4 As a result, there is often little that can be
t Michael T. Heaney is Assistant Professor of Organizational Studies and Political
Science at the University of Michigan. For excellent research assistance, he thanks the
members of the Political Networks Lab Group at the University of Michigan: Alex Hartley, Brian Kobashigawa, Courtney Lantzer, Erika Vijh, Erin Reed, Katrina Gumbinner,
Laura Katsnelson, Michael Stern, Monica Shattuck, Rayza Goldsmith, Sahar Adora,
Susannah Hope, and Vicki Lau. Further, he thanks Fabio Rojas, Kathryn Pearson, and
Matthew Green for helpful suggestions.
I US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11; Art I, § 9, cl 7; Art II, § 2, cl 1.
2 See generally Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347 (Wesleyan 1961)
(Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
3 See generally Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress,Presidents,and the
Politics of Waging War (Chicago 2010); William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, While
Dangers Gather:CongressionalChecks on PresidentialWar Powers (Princeton 2007).
4 50 USC §§ 1541-1548; David P. Auerswald and Peter F. Cowhey, Ballotbox Diplo-

129

130

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

done effectively to stop a president who has decided to commit
troops to a conflict.
Congress may often appear to be powerless in the warmaking arena, but it does retain some tools with which to cajole
the president. By offering antiwar resolutions and speaking out
against the president's use of force, Congress has the ability to
raise the domestic political costs of military action to the president. In his recent book, After the Rubicon: Congress,Presidents,
and the Politics of Waging War, Douglas L. Kriner uses statistical analysis to demonstrate persuasively that opposition within
Congress has the effect of significantly shortening the duration of
military conflicts.5 He concludes that "the maneuverings of individual members of Congress in the public sphere have significant
ramifications for the president's conduct of ongoing military operations."6
Yet, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven to be exceptionally difficult cases for Congress to exert control over the
president's war-making prerogatives. During his two terms in
office, President George W. Bush demonstrated the willingness
to pay immense domestic political costs in order to maintain the
occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. 7 President Barack Obama,
after having campaigned for the presidency, in part on an antiwar platform, largely maintained Bush's policies in this domain.8
Obama's positions are especially surprising in light of the substantial electoral benefits that the Democratic Party reaped due
to its opposition to the Iraq War.9 Indeed, the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have gone on to be among the longest military conflicts in American history.10 This Article argues that partisan
politics is a critical factor explaining congressional opposition to
these wars, as well as support for their continuation.
macy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use ofForce,41 Intl Stud Q 505, 506 (1997).
5 Kriner, After the Rubicon at 147-92 (cited in note 3).
6 Id at 191.
7 Id at 269-86.

8 Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas, The PartisanDynamics of Contention:Demobilization of the Antiwar Movement in the United States,2007-2009, 16 Mobilization Intl
J 45 (2011).
9 See generally Christian R. Grose and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The Iraq War, Partisanship, and CandidateAttributes: Variation in PartisanSwing in the 2006 US. House
Elections, 32 Legis Stud Q 531 (2007); Douglas L. Kriner and Francis X. Shen, Iraq Casualties and the 2006 Senate Election, 32 Legis Stud Q 507 (2007); Scott Sigmund Gartner
and Gary M. Segura, All Politics are Still Local: The Iraq War and the 2006 Midterm
Elections, 41 PS Polit Sci Polit 95 (2008).
10 See generally Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between
America and Al-Qaeda(Free Press 2011).
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In light of the continued American military involvement in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to examine the nature of
the congressional response to executive war-making prerogatives
in these theaters. To that end, this Article asks what factors determined congressional opposition to war from 2001 to 2011.
First, the Article explains the link between political parties and
the exercise of war-making powers by Congress and the president. It argues that, while Democratic partisanship sometimes
yields incentives to oppose war and Republican partisanship
sometimes encourages support for war, these incentives may be
reversed, in part, depending on the party of the president at the
time. Second, the Article explains the methodology for conducting content analysis of all antiwar legislation introduced in the
107th through 111th Congresses (2001-2011). Third, the Article
presents a statistical analysis of the decisions of individual
members of Congress to sponsor or cosponsor antiwar legislation.
Fourth, it examines trends in the introduction and progress of
antiwar legislation, as well as the emergence of congressional
networks supporting that legislation. Fifth, it considers the substance of antiwar legislation and how it reflects the evolving conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their political contexts. The
Article concludes by discussing the political implications created
by partisanship for opponents of war and suggests political strategies to counteract the power of parties in this domain.
I. POLITICAL PARTIES AND WAR
Members of Congress have both policy and partisan reasons
to take positions on questions of war and peace. Members have
sincerely held beliefs about how the United States should or
should not use force in the international arena. These beliefs
may be influenced by ideology, the desire to represent constituents, personal characteristics (for example, veteran status, gender), or other factors that shape members' understandings of the
issue. At the same time, there may be strategic reasons to support or oppose going to war. If a member is of the same party as
that of the president, then that member may have political incentives to support the president's war initiatives." Conversely,
if a member is of the opposite party as that of the president, then
that member may have political incentives to oppose the president's use of force.
11 William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of
Force,59 Intl Org 209, 216 (2005).
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The sincere beliefs of members of Congress about war may
correlate with political party membership. This correlation may
exist because of commonalities among the members of a party in
ideology, the composition of their constituencies, personal characteristics, and other factors. In particular, a strong antiwar faction has long been connected to the Democratic Party. In the
post-World War II era, liberal Democrats emerged as a voice for
peace in a world dominated by a Cold War with the Soviet Union
and a developing nuclear arms race. 12 During the Vietnam War
era, important voices for peace came in the form of politicians
within the Democratic Party, such as US Senators George
McGovern and Robert F. Kennedy. Democrats were a key part of
the coalition opposing the Iraq War in the early 2000s, which led
to benefits for the Democratic Party at the polls due to antiwar
sentiments in the public, especially in the 2006 midterm congressional elections. 13 At the same time, the Democratic Party
has included strong advocates for war, particularly from among
its members from southern states. 14 The existence of this pro-war
faction means that the Democratic Party is often split on questions of war and peace. Analogously, the Republican Party contains a libertarian-isolationist wing, embodied by members such
as Congressman Ron Paul of Texas.15 Yet, to the extent that antiwar voices are raised within Congress, they usually (but not
always) come from within the Democratic Party.
The strategic incentives for members of Congress to support
or oppose going to war are closely connected to the demands of
their party leaders. Parties act as teams because members know
that their fates rise and fall together. 16 In order to compel teamwork, the parties have created institutions and rules within
Congress to incentivize members' compliance with the leadership
12 Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam
Era 18-19 (Syracuse 1990).
13 At the mass level, Democrats and Republicans exhibited considerable differences
in their approval of the Iraq War, with the gap between the two groups exceeding seventy
points in most public opinion polls. See Gary C. Jacobson, Perception,Memory, and Partisan Polarizationon the Iraq War, 125 Polit Sci Q 31, 32 (2010). Similarly large divisions
existed among mobilized protesters along party lines. See Michael T. Heaney and Fabio
Rojas, Partisans,Nonpartisans,and the Antiwar Movement in the United States, 35 Am
Polit Res 431 (2007).
14 Glenn Feldmann, Southern Disillusionment with the Democratic Party: Cultural
Conformity and "the Great Melding" of Racial and Economic Conservatism in Alabama
during World War 11, 43 J Am Stud 199, 221 (2009).
15 Jason A. Edwards, Debating America's Role in the World: Representative Ron
Paul'sExceptionalistJeremiad,55 Am Behavioral Sci 253, 253 (2011).
16 See generally Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan:
PartyGovernment in the House (California 2007).
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of their party caucus." The power of parties to exert control over
their members has risen steadily since the 1970s, during which
time the polarization between the parties increased to its highest
point in over a century.1 8 Thus, members of Congress who oppose
their party's line are more isolated today than at any time in recent memory. Concomitantly, congressional party leaders have
greater resources to punish defectors from their party line, especially by leveraging party-directed campaign contributions.19
Congressional responses to matters of war and peace, like any
other issue, are thus likely to conform closely with the agendas of
party leaders.
Incentives for members of Congress to toe the party line
come not only from within Congress, but from the president as
well. Presidents have been much more partisan actors since the
Reagan era than they had been during the middle of the twentieth century. 20 President George W. Bush, in particular, stood as
a relentlessly partisan leader. 21 In the present era, presidents
work actively to support their co-partisans in Congress during
elections, craft notably partisan agendas, and, in turn, find that
their public support comes largely from citizens identifying with
their own party.22 As a result, partisans of the opposite party
have little incentive to cooperate with the president in the legislative arena. The president comes to rely almost exclusively on
the members of his own party to advance legislation and becomes
intimately involved in the workings of his party's congressional
caucus. 23 The pressures of the strong partisan presidency, along
with leader-enforced party discipline in Congress, make it likely
17 David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House 82-160 (Chicago
1991).
18 Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The
Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, 23 (MIT 2006); Jeffrey W. Ladewig, Ideological
Polarizationand the Vanishing of Marginals:Retrospective Roll-Call Voting in the U.S.
Congress, 72 J Polit 499, 499 (2010); Richard Born, PartyPolarization and the Rise of
Partisan Voting in U.S. House Elections,36 Am Polit Res 62, 62-63 (2008); Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarizationin Congress 20-28 (Cambridge 2008); Seth E. Masket, No Middle Ground:How Informal Party OrganizationsControlNominations and PolarizeLegislatures 3 (Michigan 2009).
19 Kathryn Pearson and Eric Schickler, The Transition to DemocraticLeadershioin a
PolarizedHouse, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered 165-88 (CQ 9th ed 2009).
20 Richard M. Skinner, George W Bush and the PartisanPresidency, 123 Polit Sci Q
605, 605 (2009).
21 See generally Gary C. Jacobson, A Divider,Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the
American People (Pearson 2007).
22 Skinner, George W. Bush at 610-15 (cited in note 20).
23 Skinner, George W. Bush at 614 (cited in note 20).
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that members of Congress will support wars prosecuted by their
co-partisans in the White House and oppose war-making adventures of presidents of the opposite party.24
This Article makes three arguments about partisanship and
the behavior of members of Congress on issues of war and peace.
First, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to oppose
war, other things equal. Second, members of Congress are likely
to support war when it is prosecuted by a president of their own
party and to oppose war when it is undertaken by a president
from the opposing party, other things equal. Third, partisanship
affects the introduction of antiwar legislation, the content of that
legislation, and the network of support that develops around it.
These arguments collectively suggest that parties have enormous
power on issues of war and peace, and that the direction of these
pressures may change with the alignment of the parties.
II. METHODOLOGY
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan enjoyed considerable formal support from Congress. The war in Afghanistan was authorized by a vote of 420-1 in the US House of Representatives and
98-0 in the US Senate. 25 The war in Iraq was authorized by a
vote of 297-133 in the House and 77-23 in the Senate. 26 After authorizing the wars, Congress passed annual appropriations and
several supplemental appropriation bills to fund the military occupations. 7 Efforts to add antiwar provisions to these bills
through appropriation riders and other tactics proved futile. 28
Republican control of Congress for most of the 2001-2006 period
meant that most antiwar bills failed to come to a vote, and thus,
Congress put few obstacles in the way of President Bush's conduct of war. 2 9 Similarly, Democrats in Congress have not allowed
many votes on antiwar legislation since the inauguration of President Obama in 2009. Thus, given the paucity of bills that came
2 See generally Kriner, After the Rubicon (cited in note 3).
25 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrrists,Pub Law No 107-40,
115 Stat 224 (2001), codified at 50 USC § 1541; Library of Congress, Thomas, online at
httpVthomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d07:SJ00023:@@@X (visited Sept 19, 2011).
26 Authorizationfor Use of MilitaryForce Against Iraq Resolution of 202, Pub Law
No 107-243, 116 Stat 1498 (2002), codified at 50 USC § 1541; online at
httpV/www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hjres1l4enr/pdf/BILLS-107hjresll4enr.pdf
(visited Sept 19, 2011).
27 Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 Stan J
Intl L 291, 291-92 (2006).
28 Id.
29 Kriner, After the Rubicon at 269-86 (cited in note 3).
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to a vote in Congress, examining roll call votes in Congress-the
most common method of assessing congressional position-taking
on issues-would be a poor way to understand the nature of congressional opposition to war in the post-9/11 period. Instead, this
Article examines the sponsors, cosponsors, and content of all antiwar legislation introduced from 2001 to 2011. This approach
facilitates the investigation of the sources and causes of opposition to war in Congress, even if the vehicles of this opposition did
not advance very far in the legislative process.
Data on antiwar legislation were gathered by searching the
Thomas.gov web site hosted by the Library of Congress. 30 The
database was searched for legislation containing any of fifteen
key terms. 31 Four research assistants read each piece of legislation identified by this search to determine if it was antiwar in
nature. Legislation was labeled as antiwar if it appeared to have
the intent to impede the ability of the president to carry out military actions or if it was intended to express disapproval of those
actions, or war in general. If any reader marked the legislation
as potentially antiwar, then the legislation was placed on a list
for further discussion. All the legislation on this list was then
discussed among all readers (as well as the author of the study)
to reach consensus on the final list. For each of the 131 pieces of
legislation reaching the final list (which is provided in the Appendix), the sponsors and cosponsors of the legislation were recorded. The provisions of each piece of legislation were coded into
one or more of thirteen substantive categories. 32
The sponsorship/cosponsorship data were compiled on a
member-by-member basis. Using these data, the determinants of
sponsorship/cosponsorship of antiwar legislation can be assessed.
Further, the legislative progress of each piece of legislation was
recorded. The following sections report the results of statistical
analysis of these data.

30 Library of Congress, Thomas, online at httpV/thomas.gov/ (visited Sept 11, 2011).
31 The terms were: armed forces and national security, Afghanistan, civil liberties,
Department of Defense, detention of persons, Iraq, military agreements, military bases,
military intervention, military operations, military personnel, military policy, military
withdrawal, National Guard and Reserves, and war crimes.
32 The thirteen categories were: immediate withdrawal, withdrawal by specific date,
no escalation of troops, no permanent bases, redeployment of troops away from war zone,
condemn doctrine of preemption, alter institutional powers for peace, require Iraqi approval for US actions, adopt policies to stabilize Iraq, focus on diplomatic relations, censuring of American Leadership, no war on Iran, and other provisions.
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III. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION
Each bill presented for consideration in the US Congress has
one unique sponsor. Since the mid-1930s in the Senate and 1967
in the House, members of Congress have been permitted to cosponsor legislation by adding their names to a bill in order to
indicate support. 33 Cosponsorship is a common practice, with
over half of all bills having at least one cosponsor. 34 However,
cosponsorship is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a
member ultimately to support legislation on the floor. Noncosponsors may vote in favor of a bill, while cosponsors may
withdraw their support at the last minute. A cosponsored bill
might never come up for a vote. Rather than indicating solid
commitments, cosponsorship is better understood as a low-cost
method for members to signal policy positions to their constituents or other members. 35 Cosponsorship may also be a way for
members to attempt to manipulate Congress's agenda in favor of
their preferences. 36 Thus, examining sponsorship and cosponsorship is a particularly effective way to assess support for legislation that is unlikely to be voted on by the entire chamber, as was
the case for much antiwar legislation between 2001 and 2011.
Most members of Congress did not sponsor or cosponsor antiwar legislation in the 107th Congress (2001-2003). In those
years, forty members each sponsored or cosponsored one piece of
antiwar legislation, twenty-four members each supported two
pieces, and three members each got behind three pieces. 475
members, which constituted an overwhelming majority (88 percent), supported no antiwar legislation at all. The antiwar cause
grew in the ensuing years, reaching a peak of support in the
110th Congress (2007-2009). During that Congress, eighty-one
members each sponsored or cosponsored one piece of antiwar legislation, fifty-six members each supported two pieces, and 149
members each signed on to three or more pieces of antiwar legislation. At the maximum, two members each sponsored or cospon33 James E. Campbell, CosponsoringLegislationin the U.S. Congress, 7 Legis Stud Q
415,415(1982).
3 Rick K. Wilson and Cheryl D. Young, Cosponsorshipin the US. Congress,22 Legis
Stud Q 25, 40 (1997).
35 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 61 n 105 (Yale 1974) (see
discussion of cosponsorship in footnote); Daniel Kessler and Keith Krehbiel, Dynamics of
Cosponsorshio,90 Am Polit Sci Rev 555, 563 (1996).
36 See Gregory Koger, Position Taking and Cosponsorshipin the US. House, 28 Legis
Stud Q 225, 241 (2003); Jeffrey C. Talbert and Matthew Potoski, Setting the Legislative
Agenda: The DimensionalStructureofBill CosponsoringandFloor Voting, 64 J Polit 864,
865 (2002).
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sored twenty antiwar initiatives. Slightly less than a majority of
263 members (48 percent) did not back any antiwar legislation.
What accounts for this variation?
This Section reports the results of three regression models
that explain why members of Congress sponsored or cosponsored
antiwar legislation. The dependent variable in these models is
the count of the number of times, per Congress, that a member
sponsored or cosponsored antiwar legislation. This measure provides a useful (though imperfect) indication of the strength of a
member's public opposition to war. Members sponsoring/cosponsoring more antiwar bille/resolutions are assumed to
take a stronger public antiwar stance than members sponsoring/cosponsoring fewer billh/resolutions. 37
The regressions are estimated using negative binomial regression models. This approach is appropriate when the dependent variable is a count of something that has zero values occurring frequently. 38 Model 1 examines the count of all sponsorships
and cosponsorships by all members of the 107th through 111th
Congresses (2001 to 2011). Models 2 and 3 break the results
down by political party. Model 2 examines only Democrats for
the 107th through 111th Congresses. Model 3 examines only Republicans for the 110th Congress (2007 to 2009), which was the
only Congress in this period during which Republicans sponsored/cosponsored a significant number of antiwar bills. Models 1
and 2 are estimated using random effects negative binomial
models with bootstrap standard errors, due to the panel nature
of the data. 39 Model 3 is estimated with a standard negative binomial model because the data involve only one Congress and,
thus, do not constitute a panel.
Each model contains four sets of independent variables: (1)
partisanship and ideology, (2) Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) position
in Congress, and (4) personal characteristics. The partisanship
and ideology variables include whether a member is a Democrat
or not (scored 1 or 0), whether or not the member is of the same
party as the president, and the degree to which the member has
37 This measure is imperfect because members may choose to express their opposition
to war, for example, by making strong speeches against war instead of cosponsoring legislation. Or, they may choose to cosponsor weak antiwar bills/resolutions. However, the
assumption behind using the measure is that these other indicators of opposition to war
are likely to correlate highly with sponsorship/cosponsorship of legislation.
3 Joseph M. Hilbe, Negative BinomialRegression, 4-6 (Cambridge 2d ed 2007).
39 Id at 478. The data are "panel data" because there are repeated observations of
individual members of Congress, with some members of Congress appearing in all five
Congresses.
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a liberal ideology (scored from -1.315-extremely conservative-to
0.778-extremely liberal). 40 The Iraq and Afghanistan variables
include total deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan (per Congress),41
percent of the public against war in Iraq (per Congress),42 and
whether or not (1 or 0) the member voted in favor of the Iraq War
(HJ Res 114).43 The position-in-Congress variables include
whether a member is in the House of Representatives (=1) or the
Senate (=0), whether or not the member is party of her party's
leadership (scored 1 or 0), whether or not a member serves on the
Armed Services Committee or the Veterans' Affairs Committee
(scored 1 for membership, or 0), and seniority as indicated by the
number of Congresses of which she has been a member.44 The
personal characteristics variables included gender (female=1,
male=0), race (black/African American=1, non-black=0), ethnicity
(Latino/Hispanic=1, non-Latino=0), and military veteran status
(veteran=1, nonveteran=0).
The estimates of the three models are reported in Table 1.
The estimates of Model 1 provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that Democrats are more supportive of antiwar legislation than are Republicans. The coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant. This result implies that being a
Democrat increases the expected number of antiwar bills/
resolutions that a member sponsors/consponsors." Republicans
may sponsor/cosponsor legislation against war, but they do so
less often than Democrats, other things equal.
The estimates of Models 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that
members are less likely to support antiwar legislation when their
40 Royce Carroll, et al, DW-NOMBNATE Scores With BootstrappedStandardErrors
(2011), online at httpV/voteview.conVdwnominate.asp (visited Sept 11, 2011). Ideology is
measured using members' roll call votes. For an explanation of this method, see generally
Royce Carroll, et al, Measuring Bias and Uncertaintyin DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point
Estimates via the ParametricBootstrap 17 Polit Anal 261 (2009). For ease of interpretation, the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores have been multiplied by -1 in order to
reverse the interpretation of the variable from "conservative" ideology to "liberal" ideology.
41 US Department of Defense, Military Casualty Information (2011), online at
httpV/siadapp.dmde.osd.miVpersonneVCASUALTY/castop.htm (visited Sept 11, 2011).
42 Gallup, Iraq online at http/www.gallup.conpolyl633/iraq.aspx (visited Sept 19,
2011).
43 Clerk of the US House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 455,
online at httpV/clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll455.xml (visited Sept 11, 2011).
4 United States Congress, Official CongressionalDirectory (US Government Printing Office 2001-2011).
45 This variable is excluded from Models 2 and 3 because party membership does not
vary in these models: all cases of the regression are either Democrats (Model 2) or Republicans (Model 3).
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party controls the White House. The coefficient on this variable
is negative and significant in Model 1, indicating that all members are subject to this effect, regardless of their party membership. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant
in Model 2, indicating that this effect applies specifically in the
case of Democrats: when Barack Obama became President, Democrats became significantly less likely to sponsor or cosponsor
antiwar legislation. 46 Thus, these results provide statistical support that members of Congress tend to abandon their party's typical position on war if doing so allows them to help their copartisan in the White House or score political points if their partisan opponent occupies the White House.
The estimates of Models 2 and 3 support the hypothesis that
backing of antiwar legislation is more likely to come from relatively more liberal (or less conservative) members of both the
Democratic and Republican caucuses. The coefficient on the liberal ideology variable is positive and statistically significant in
both equations. 47 Thus, intensely liberal Democrats are the ones
that are more likely to support the antiwar cause, while relatively more moderate/conservative Democrats are less likely to sponsor/cosponsor antiwar legislation. In the Republican Party,
strongly conservative members are less likely to oppose war,
while relatively more moderate/liberal members are more likely
to support antiwar legislation. Overall, the regression results of
the three models reported in Table 1 support the argument that
there are significant connections between partisanship and congressional positions on questions of war and peace.
In addition to examining the statistical effects of partisanship and ideology, it is essential to control for the effects of potential confounding variables. For example, it is possible that a
statistical effect seemingly due to Democratic Party membership
is, in fact, due to gender, race, or another variable that correlates
with party membership. Thus, by controlling for these factors in
the regression, it is possible to reduce the chances that the conclusions about partisanship drawn from the regression are the
spurious result of other causes.
46 This variable is excluded from Model 3 because party membership does not vary
among the cases of this Republican-only regression.
47 This variable is excluded from Model 1 because of the high degree of correlation
(=0.9377) between ideology and party membership. This correlation causes strong multicollinearity, which makes it difficult to estimate the effects of party and ideology separately. The effects of ideology are thus better understood within parties than across parties.
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TABLE 1. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS ON ANTIWAR
LEGISLATIVE SPONSORSHIP/COSPONSORSHIP IN CONGRESS,

2001-2011
Dependent Variable:
Count of Antiwar Sponsorships
Cosponsorshipsper Memberper Congress

Independent Variable

Model 1

Model 2

All Members

Democrats

1

0 7 th- 1 1 1 th

Congresses
2001-11

1 0 7

t-

1 1 1

Model 3

h

Congresses
2001-11

Republicans
11h

Congress
2007-09

Coefficient
(Bootstrap Standard Error)
Partisanship and Ideology
1.9012**
(0.1888)
-0.8858
(0.0567)

Democrat = 1
Same Party as President= 1

LiberalIdeology

0.9223*
(0.0575)
6.6391
(0.3454)

3.6169
(1.4244)

0.0004
(0.0000)
0.0749
(0.0054)
-0.2943
(0.1637)

0.0219
(0.4478)

-

Iraq and Afghanistan
Total Deaths in Iraq and Afghani

stan (per Congress)
Percentof PublicAgainst War in

Iraq (per Congress)
Voted in Favorof Iraq War

(HJRes114)

=

1

0.0005
(0.0001)
0.0685'*
(0.0044)
-1.0006
(0.1400)

Position in Congress
0.7047***
Member of House of
Representatives= 1
Member ofPartyLeadership

1

Member of Armed Services

Committee = 1
Member of Veterans'Affairs
Committee = 1
Committee-=-1-(0.1559)-(0.1568)
Seniority in Number of Congresses

Served

0.9730***

0.2432

(0.1568)

(0.3909)
-0.9274*
(0.4522)
-0.2397
(0.3643)

(0.1869)

0.0503
(0.1785)

0.5315
(5.7544)

0.0670***
(0.0128)

-0.0140
(0.0121)

(0.1936)

(0.1320)

0.0352
(0.1297)
-0.0663
(0.1559)
0.0196

0.0457
(0.1131)
0.2026

Table continued on next page.

(0.3643)_
0.1004
(0.0522)

129]

141

ANTIWAR LEGISLATION

TABLE 1 CONTINUED. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS ON
ANTIWAR LEGISLATIVE SPONSORSHIP/COSPONSORSHIP IN
CONGRESS, 2001-2011
Personal
Characteristics
Se/Genderis Female = 1

Race is Black/African American = 1

Ethnicity is Latin/Hispanic= 1
Military Veteran = 1

Constant

P

0.4664***

0.2080

-0.1672

(0.1346)

(0.1115)

(0.6031)

0.7529***

0.2612**

(0.1281)

(0.0981)

-0.1607

-0.2036

14.2740***

(0.1928)

(0.1634)

(3.5922)

0.2071

0.1200

0.0492

(0.1785)

(0.1365)

(0.3154)

-4.7537***

6.0304***

0.1142

(0.4956)

(0.5105)

(0.6485)

6.1301 ***
(1.5355)

14.9156***
(3.3430)

0.9909***
(0.1104)

a

3.6906***
(0.7883)
1.7449
(6.9578)

a

Data Format
Sample Size (N)
Mean of the Dependent Variable
Log Likelihood
2

Degrees of Freedom

Panel

Panel

2,719
1.0029
-2,289.6467

1,380
1.855797
-1,791.6098

4,977.43***
14

2,041.89*
14

Cross
Section
256
0.3750
185.0596
39.86***
10

Note: * p<0.050, ** p<0.010, *** p 0.001.

The first set of control variables account for the situation in
Iraq and Afghanistan, public reactions to that situation, and positions that members have taken on the Iraq War. Members of
Congress are likely to be sensitive to battle deaths in lending
their support to war. 48 Consistent with this concern, Models 1
and 2 show that support for antiwar positions significantly in48 Kriner, After the Rubicon at 243 (cited in note 3).

142

THI

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

49
creases with the rise in casualties among US service members.
Politicians are similarly sensitive to public opinion about war.5 0
The results reveal that sponsorships/cosponsorships increase
51
positively and significantly as public opinion turns against war.
Finally, individual members are constrained by their own prior
positions on war. All three models include a variable that indicates whether or not the member voted for (=1) or did not vote for
(=0) the resolution to use force in Iraq. It was possible to vote in
favor of this resolution only if the member was serving in Congress on October 16, 2002. As a result, any person joining Congress after this date is scored as a zero on this variable. The expectation is that having voted in favor of the Iraq War serves as
a constraint on members' willingness to support antiwar legislation, as opposing the war at a later date may make them appear
inconsistent, even if the factual situation about the war changes
over time. Consistent with this expectation, the results of Model
1 show the expected significant, negative relationship: having
voted to authorize the Iraq War makes it less likely that a member will join the antiwar cause. This effect is not present in Models 2 and 3, however, where the data are split according to party.
This finding suggests that members may be influenced more by
their party membership in sponsoring/cosponsoring legislation
than by their earlier vote on the use of force in Iraq.
The second set of control variables examines the effects of
members' positions in Congress on their sponsorship/cosponsorship. The results of Model 1 show that members of the
House of Representatives sponsor/cosponsor more antiwar legislation than members of the Senate, which is largely due to the
different sizes of the chambers, with 100 members in the Senate
and 435 members in the House. This finding holds in Model 2
when only Democrats are examined, but the estimates of Model 3
suggest that the relative size of the chambers does not matter for
sponsorship/cosponsorship by Republicans. The results of Models
1 and 2 show that being a member of the party leadership does

49 This variable is not included in Model 3 because casualties are measured per Congress, but there is only one Congress (the 110th) included in Model 3.
50 Adam J. Berinsky, In Tae of War: UnderstandingAmerican Public Opinion from
World War II to Iraq 192 (Chicago 2009).
51 It is important to consider whether this result may have been created by reverse
causation. That is, could public opinion in this case have been caused by congressional
action? Indeed, it is reasonable to hypothesize that public opinion may be shaped by significant legislation passed by Congress. However, in this case, Congress took no action
against war. Since it is unlikely that a substantial percentage of the public was aware of
members' sponsorship cosponsorships, the possibility of reverse causation is implausible.
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not matter for the Congress as a whole or for Democrats only,
but Model 3 reveals that members of the Republican Party leadership are significantly less likely to sponsor/cosponsor antiwar
legislation than are rank-and-file Republicans. Holding a seat on
the Armed Services or Veterans Affairs committees does not
matter in any of the estimated models. Seniority is a significant,
positive predictor of sponsorship/cosponsorship for the Congress
as a whole but no longer appears significant when the data are
split by party. 52
The final set of control variables takes into account the potential effect of personal characteristics on sponsorship/cosponsorship behavior. Women appear significantly more likely to
sponsor/cosponsor legislation when examining the Congress as a
whole, but this variable loses it significance when the data are
split by party.53 African Americans display a greater willingness
to sponsor/cosponsor legislation in Models 1 and 2, though this
coefficient cannot be estimated in the Republican-only equation,
since there were no African-American Republican members of
the 110th Congress. Latino ethnicity reduced the likelihood of
supporting the antiwar cause among Republicans (in Model 3)
but made no difference among Democrats or Congress as a
whole. Military veteran status did not affect the propensity to
sponsor/cosponsor legislation in any of the three models.
Overall, the regression analysis highlights the power of political parties in affecting congressional resistance to war. Democrats are much more likely to support antiwar legislation than
are Republicans, though the election of a Democratic president in
2008 reduced Democratic willingness to back the antiwar cause.
Although some Democrats still supported antiwar legislation
after the election of Obama, the center of this support collapsed
in the 111th Congress. However, partisanship was not the only
factor that determined members' responses to war. US battle
deaths, public opinion, and members' previous commitments on
war mattered, as did gender, race, and ethnicity. The next section reports on how partisanship affected the progress of antiwar
legislation in Congress over the 2001-2011 period.
52 The seniority effect vanishes in Model 2 and 3 because of the introduction of the
ideology variable in these models. Seniority is correlated with ideology, with the more
senior Democrats more likely to hail from the liberal wing of the party and more senior
Republicans more likely to identify with the conservative wing of the party. Thus, the
inclusion of the ideology variable suppresses the statistical effect of seniority.
53 The statistical significance of the gender effect disappears from the regression
when the data are split by party because of the correlation between gender and party
membership.
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IV. PARTIES AND LEGISLATIVE DYNAmICS

The previous Section explains the role of partisanship in the
decisions of individual members of Congress to sponsor/cosponsor
antiwar legislation or not. This Section considers the effect of
partisan politics on the overall pattern of development of antiwar
legislation in Congress. First, it looks at trends in the introduction, sponsorship, and cosponsorship of legislation. Second, it
reports on the progress of legislation in committees and on the
floor of the House and Senate. Third, it maps the evolution of
networks of legislative sponsorship/cosponsorship. Each of these
trends reveals the importance of partisan politics in the unfolding of antiwar legislation.
Members of Congress may introduce antiwar legislation because of their sincere opposition to war or because they want to
convey an antiwar stance to their constituents and other political
actors. However, the likelihood of success of the legislation may
be a factor in determining whether or not to introduce it. Since
parties take strong stands on this issue, it may be advisable for
members to look to the partisan composition of Congress and the
party of the president in deciding whether or not to introduce a
bill. The data reported in Figure 1, which tracks the volume of
antiwar legislation in Congress over time, strongly suggests that
members do, indeed, pay close attention to the partisan balance
in Congress when making these decisions.
FIGURE 1. VOLUME OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS,
2001-2011
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Republican control of the presidency and both chambers of
Congress for most of the 107th through 109th Congresses made
it highly unlikely that antiwar bills would progress much during
this period. Figure 1 reveals that, in keeping with this expectation, members of Congress introduced fewer than thirty antiwar
bills per year during those years. All but one of these bills were
sponsored by Democrats. The Democrats' capture of both houses
of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections changed this calculus.
Democrats had ridden the wave of antiwar sentiment to achieve
a governing majority. 54 Thus, there was reason to believe that
antiwar legislation stood a chance in the 110th Congress. Democrats introduced sixty-six pieces of legislation with antiwar content. Seeking to have a voice in this emerging issue, Republicans
introduced ten bills with antiwar content in the 110th Congress.
However, after the election of a Democrat as president in 2008,
the introduction of antiwar legislation plummeted to its lowest
level since the period immediately following 9/11. Democrats introduced only eleven antiwar bills in the 111th Congress, with
Republicans introducing none. Even though the Democrats still
controlled both chambers of the 111th Congress, changing war
policy through legislation was less a part of the Democrats' political strategy with Barack Obama in the White House.
Introducing legislation allows members of Congress to express their positions on issues that might not come up for a vote
and signal to their constituents that they are "doing something"
about the matters that concern them. Nonetheless, legislation
generally has a greater impact on policy if it actually becomes
law than if it merely is logged in the CongressionalRecord.55 To
determine the impact of legislation, it is essential to examine its
progress through Congress. To that end, the data reported in
Figure 2 document the progress of antiwar legislation.
Antiwar legislation did not make much progress in Congress
during the 107th through 109th Congresses. As indicated in Figure 2, the Republican leadership did not allow committee meet5 Gartner and Segura, 41 PS Polit Sci Polit at 95 (cited in note 9).
55 Legislation which is introduced, but not enacted into law, may influence public
policy if it receives a great deal of support from within Congress. The expression of support signals the salience of the issue to other political actors, such as the president, who
may wish to preempt future congressional action by resolving the issue administratively.
See William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion:The Politics of Direct Presidential
Action 107-09 (Princeton 2003); William Howell and Douglas Kriner, Power Without
Persuasion:Identifying Executive Influence, in Bert A. Rockman and Richard W. Waterman, eds, PresidentialLeadership: The Vortex ofPower 105-44 (Oxford 2008). See also
Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and PresidentialPower
155 (Princeton 2001).
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ings on antiwar legislation or allow votes on the floor, except in a
small handful of cases. Not a single antiwar bill was passed by
Congress. The situation changed noticeably in the 110th Congress with the resurgence of Democratic control. Sixteen antiwar
bills were discussed in committee meetings, five were voted on in
the House, and four passed the House.5 6 None of these bills
passed the Senate, preventing them from becoming law. By the
111th Congress, the Democratic leadership lost its interest in
advancing antiwar legislation. Indeed, rates of consideration and
passage of antiwar legislation returned to the levels during the
period of Republican control. Democrats in Congress had no
plans to tie President Obama's hands in dealing with Iraq or Afghanistan.
FIGURE 2. PROGRESS OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN
CONGRESS, 2001-2011
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The evolution of partisan support for antiwar legislation can
be understood more clearly by mapping the network of support
for legislation over time. Network analysis is a method of visualizing the patterns of support for cosponsored legislation.5 7 In the
56 The bills that passed the House were: 1. H CON RES 63, a resolution disapproving
of the decision of the president announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than
20,000 additional US combat troops to Iraq; 2. HR 2929, a bill to limit the use of funds to
establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent
stationing of US Armed Forces in Iraq; 3. HR 2956, the Responsible Redeployment from
Iraq Act; and 4. HR 4156, Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations
Act, 2008.
57 See generally James H. Fowler, Legislative CosponsorshipNetworks in the US
House and Senate, 28 Soc Net 454 (2006); James H. Fowler, Connectingthe Congress: A
Study of Cosponsorship Networks, 14 Polit Anal 456 (2006); Wendy K. Tam Cho and
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five figures that follow, the connections between members of
Congress and legislation are mapped for each of the five Congresses in this study (107th through 111th). In these figures,
black squares represent bills, white circles represent Democratic
members of Congress, and gray circles represent Republican
members of Congress. The existence of a line between a circle
and a square means that a member of Congress (circle) has sponsored/cosponsored a piece of legislation (square). The graphs are
drawn using an algorithm that places circles close to one another
if they are connected with the same squares and places squares
close to one another if they are connected with the same circles.58
The most central59 pieces of legislation are identified in each
graph with labels for their bill numbers.
The network of antiwar legislation from the 107th Congress
is represented in Figure 3. This network includes six bills-five
from the House and one from the Senate, which is a relatively
small amount of legislative activity. The most popular
bills/resolutions were HR 2459, H Con Res 473, HJ Res 110, and
S Con Res 133. HR 2459 was a resolution introduced by Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) to create a Department of
Peace, a longstanding cause of the Congressman. H Con Res 473
was a resolution introduced by Congresswoman Barbara Lee (DCA), which was perhaps the first comprehensive statement by
antiwar voices within Congress. It "express[ed] the sense of Congress with respect to the importance of the United States [sic]
working through the United Nations to assure Iraq's compliance
with United Nations Security Council resolutions and advance
peace and security in the Persian Gulf region."60 HJ Res 110 was
a resolution introduced by Congressman Alcee Hastings (D-FL)
that would have required the United States to obtain sanction
from the United Nations Security Council before attacking Iraq.
S Con Res 133 was a resolution introduced by Senator Diane
Feinstein (D-CA) expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should not attack Iraq without explicit authorization
James H. Fowler, Legislative Success in a Small World: Social Network Analysis and the
Dynamics of CongressionalLegislation, 72 J Polit 124 (2010).
5 See generally Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman,
Ucinet 6.221 for Windows (Analytic Technologies 2009).
5 The "betweenness" measure of centrality is used, which is calculated on the basis
of the number of shortest paths between a piece of legislation and a specific legislator in
the network. For an explanation of this procedure, see generally Linton C. Freeman,
Centralityin Social Networks: I ConceptualClarification,1 Soc Net 215 (1978/1979).
60 Library of Congress, Thomas at http-//thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bir/query/z?cl07:H.C
ON.RES.473: (visited Sept 19, 2011).
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from a vote of the US Congress. In the House, HJ Res 110 drew
on a different coalition of support than HR 2459 and H Con Res
473. H J Res 110 used more bellicose language than the other
two bills, as, in principle, it would have authorized war if certain
(highly unlikely) conditions were met by the president. This language appealed to more hawkish members of the Democratic
caucus but was unpalatable to the relatively liberal Democrats
who signed on to HR 2459 and H Con Res 473, which explains its
comparative isolation from the rest of the network. On the whole,
the network displays a fledgling opposition to war that had only
begun to gather strength.
FIGURE 3. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR
LEGISLATION IN THE 107TH CONGRESS
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The network of antiwar legislation from the 108th Congress
is represented in Figure 4. This network is notably larger than
the networks of the 107th Congress because antiwar voices in
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Congress grew louder. A series of additional proposals were put
forward, creating a core in the center of the network. The network was still overwhelmingly Democratic in orientation, as indicated by the dominance of white circles in the figure. The lone
gray circle in this figure indicates that Republican Congressman
Ron Paul joined the network by cosponsoring HJ Res 20, a resolution to repeal the authorization for use of military force against
Iraq. At the core of this network were a series of proposals that
challenged President Bush's approach to Iraq, Afghanistan, and
terrorism. The emergence of this core reflected the coalescence of
war opposition within Congress.
FIGURE 4. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR
LEGISLATION IN THE 108TH CONGRESS
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The most central antiwar proposal in the 108th Congress
was H Con Res 392, which called for a multilateral response to
terrorism. Other key pieces of legislation were HR 1673, which
would have established a Department of Peace, and H Res 640,
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which addressed torture at Abu Ghraib. In the Senate, S Res 28,
which sought to allow United Nations weapons inspectors more
time to do their work, gained the support of nine senators. These
bills/resolutions sprouted from a mix of longstanding proposals
(such as the Department of Peace) as well as efforts to respond to
emerging problems (such as the abuse of prisoners at Abu

Ghraib).
FIGURE 5. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR
LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS
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The network of antiwar legislation from the 109th Congress
is represented in Figure 5. This graph reflects the increased den-

sity of the network resulting from a 40 percent increase in proposed legislation. Members of Congress were likely emboldened
by a number of visible missteps by the Bush Administration and
decreasing public support for war. This network is no longer homogenously Democratic, with eight Republicans joining Democrats in the antiwar cause. However, Republicans largely con-
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fined their involvement to the periphery of the Democrats' antiwar efforts, rather than coalescing around proposals of their own.
The most central antiwar proposals in the House were HR 3760,
to establish a Department of Peace, HJ Res 73, to redeploy US
forces from Iraq, and H Con Res 197, opposing the formation of
permanent US military bases in Iraq. Although several bills
were introduced by war opponents in the Senate, none managed
to attract a significant following during this Congress.
The network of antiwar legislation from the 110th Congress
is represented in Figure 6. The contrast between this network
and the network from the 107th Congress (in Figure 3) is quite
striking. In response to the Democrats' reclaiming of the House
and Senate, the network expanded dramatically to encompass
slightly more than half the Congress. While the network still had
an overwhelming Democratic majority, over fifty Republicans
cosponsored antiwar legislation.
Rather than work only at the margins of Democratic efforts,
some Republicans also forged their own proposals in the 110th
Congress. Most of these Republicans signed on to HR 2574, sponsored by Mark Udall (D-CO), which sought to implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.61 These recommendations included shoring up diplomatic relations in Iraq and redeploying US combat brigades by early 2008. As is clear from the
lower right corner of Figure 6, HR 2574 not only attracted many
Republican cosponsors, it also attracted Democratic cosponsors
who did not support most of the other antiwar legislation that
was introduced in the 110th Congress. As such, HR 2574 was an
effort to find a middle ground in the debate over ending the Iraq
War.
The core of Democratic opposition to war in the House during the 110th Congress was represented by HR 2929 and HJ Res
18. HR 2929 sought to prevent the United States from establishing permanent military bases in Iraq, while HJ Res 18 called for
the redeployment of US forces from Iraq. Democratic opposition
in the Senate gelled around SJ Res 9, which also called for redeployment of US forces out of Iraq. Limited Republican opposition
in the Senate emerged on the periphery of the antiwar network.
The network of antiwar legislation from the 111th Congress
is represented in Figure 7. This figure depicts the collapse of an61 James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, and the Iraq Study Group, The Iraq Study
Group Report: The Way Forward- A New Approach (United States Institute of Peace
2006), online at http/online.wsj.conVpublic/resourceddocumentsWSJ-iraqstudygr
oup.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2011).
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tiwar efforts in Congress following the election of Barack Obama
as president. As the number of bills fell from seventy-six to eleven, the participation of many members of Congress evaporated as
well. The structure of this network more closely resembles that
of the 108th Congress (presented in Figure 4), than it does its
immediate predecessor in the 110th Congress (presented in Figure 6), which underscores the profound change in the network
with the onset of the Obama era.
FIGURE 6. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR
LEGISLATION IN THE 110TH CONGRESS
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During the 111th Congress, antiwar efforts in the Senate
were reduced to only one bill (S 3197), supported by two Democrats and one Republican, calling for the redeployment of US
forces out of Afghanistan. In the House, Democrats constituted
the largest number of antiwar cosponsors, though Republican
allies scattered their support across a variety of bills. The most
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central bills in the House were HR 1052, which attempted to limit the deployment of troops to combat zones; HR 5015, which
proposed to redeploy forces out of Afghanistan; and HR 2404,
which called for the Secretary of Defense to submit a report outlining an exit strategy from Afghanistan.
FIGURE 7. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR
LEGISLATION IN THE 111TH CONGRESS
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The power of parties and their role in shaping opposition is
illustrated by the developments in antiwar legislation reported
in this Section. Not only does partisanship shape which legislators sponsor/cosponsor legislation (as demonstrated in the previous Section), but partisan power is critical to the timing and progress of legislation. The antiwar cause was a relatively minor
force in the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses. Fewer than
thirty bills were introduced in each of these Congresses, and these bills made little progress either in committees or on the floor.
However, once the Democrats assumed control of the 110th Con-
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gress, antiwar legislation was considered much more seriously in
committees and on the floor. Once a Democratic president was
elected, however, the Democratic majorities in the House and
Senate no longer directed their energies toward antiwar legislation. The Democrats no doubt would have faced difficulties in
passing antiwar legislation in the 111th Congress, had they attempted earnestly to do so. Centrists Democrats (the so-called
"Blue Dogs") would have raised obstacles in the House, while
passing anything over a filibuster in the Senate would have been
a challenge. 62 Nonetheless, the odds of passage were higher in
the 111th Congress than in the 110th Congress. Yet, ironically,
Democrats abandoned antiwar legislation once they had greater
potential to actually pass it.
Networks of antiwar legislation reveal the role of partisanship beyond what can be understood simply by counting pieces of
legislation. Democratic partisanship structured opposition to war
around certain legislation. Republicans joined the effort to end
the Iraq War in the 110th Congress. However, they did so on the
periphery of the larger antiwar coalition organized mostly by liberal Democrats. Once Barack Obama became President, peripheral opposition dissolved, leaving little more than the hardcore
liberal members of the Democratic Party to oppose the wars.
Support for parties-whether induced by judicious trust in copartisans, pure loyalty, or some other reason-not only defines
whether, but also when and how, members of Congress raise
their voices against war.
V. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION

The nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan changed
dramatically from 2001 to 2011. US policy evolved from pending
invasions, to prosecuting active wars, to managing occupations,
to seeking viable exit strategies, with some nonlinear back-andforth among these conditions. Likewise, the substance of congressional opposition to war varied with changing conditions and
US policy. Examination of the substance of congressional proposals to oppose war highlights the limits of Congress's capacity
to challenge the commander in chief of the armed forces. Congress is constrained by the mandate given by the Constitution to
the president, the informational advantages of the executive, and
public opinion. At the same time, the substance of antiwar pro62 Gregory Koger, Filibustering:A PoliticalHistory of Obstructionin the House and

Senate 3 (Chicago 2010).
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posals varied with the alignment between the party of the president and control of congressional majorities in Congress.
This Section considers the variation in antiwar proposals
over time. Even if legislation is introduced by its sponsors for
largely symbolic purposes, tracking changes in the substantive
content reveals much about the contours of the debate on the
issue in Congress. Table 2 reports the substantive evolution of
antiwar legislative provisions. In the immediate aftermath of
9/11, during the 107th Congress, members of Congress chose to
tread lightly in their introduction of antiwar proposals. The wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan both enjoyed high levels of public support at that time. 63 Members of Congress chose to limit their opposition to condemnation of the doctrine of preemption-which
holds that the United States has the right to attack nations that
are preparing to attack it before they do so-and calls for institutional powers for peace, diplomacy, and stabilization of Iraq. 6 4
These mild proposals might be expected from a "loyal opposition"
during wartime. Antiwar proposals became more common during
the 108th Congress. They followed a similar substantive focus as
those of the 107th Congress, though proposals placed a greater
emphasis on the condemning of the doctrine of preemption. With
public opinion turning against the war and the situation on the
ground beginning to deteriorate, members of Congress were more
willing to take a stronger stand against the war than they had
been in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
The US military occupation of Iraq faced troubled times in
2005 and 2006.65 With a rising insurgency and increasing US
battle deaths, public opinion turned more solidly against the
war. In an effort to respond to a shifting public mood, war opponents offered a wider range of antiwar proposals in the 109th
Congress than they had in previous years. Three resolutions
called for an "immediate" withdrawal, while six resolutions
called for withdrawal by a specific date or on a timetable prescribed by Congress. However, the most frequently advanced
proposal in the 109th Congress adopted more cautious language.
Seeking to avoid the potential negative connotation associated
with the word "withdrawal," eight bills proposed to "redeploy"

63 Berinsky, In Time of War at 28, 32 (cited in note 50).
6 See, for example, HR 2459, online at http/www.gpo.gov/fdays/pkg/BILLS107s2459iWpdf/BILLS-107s2459is.pdf (visited Sept 19, 2011).
65 See generally Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the
Peace(Yale 2007).
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troops away from war zones.66 Members of Congress began to
introduce legislation to block the establishment of permanent US
military bases in Iraq. Various other provisions emerged in these
years, such as resolutions to stop plans for a war on Iran, censure American leadership, and require Iraqi approval for a continued American military presence in Iraq. Thus, while the 109th
Congress reflected only a marginal increase in the volume of legislation over the 108th Congress, the content of antiwar legislation underwent a qualitative shift that reflected a more aggressive antiwar agenda.
TABLE 2. PROVISIONS IN ANTIWAR LEGISLATION BY CONGRESS,
2001-2011
Number of Bills per Congress
Provision Type

1 0 7th
Congress
2001-03

110th
Congress
2007-09

108th
Congress
2003-05

lo 9 th
Congress
2005-07

0
0

3
6

2
26

lilth
Congress
2009-11
1
6

Immediate Withdrawal
Withdrawal by Specific Date

0
0

No Escalation of Troops

0

0

0

24

2

No Permanent Bases

0

0

3

8

0

Redeployment of Troops away
from War Zone
Condemn Doctrine of Preemption

0

0

8

32

2

1

8

2

6

1

Alter Institutional Powers for
Peace
Require Iraqi Approval for US
Actions
Adopt Policies to Stabilize Iraq

4

12

5

5

3

0

0

2

7

0

1

3

4

25

1

Focus on Diplomatic Relations

4

6

6

21

1

Censuring of American
Leadership
NoWaronIran

0

1

4

6

0

0

0

1

4

0

Other Provisions

0

2

2

1

0

Total Bills

6

20

28

76

11

Note: Bills were coded into as many provision types as relevant, so the sum of each column exceeds the total number of
bills.
Source: Author's tabulations from Library of Congress, Thon66 The term "redeployment" signals that the speaker still supports military power,
but that this power is better used in another battlefield. Using "redeployment" makes it
less likely that the advocate will seem weak or in favor of "surrender," than if the term
"withdrawal" is used. For a discussion of how peace advocates moderate their language in
order to avoid questions about their patriotism, see Lynne M. Woehrle, Patrick G. Coy,
and Gregory M. Maney, ContestingPatriotism:Culture, Power, and Strategyin the Peace
Movement (Rowman and Littlefield 2008).
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as (cited in note 30).
The substance of antiwar proposals underwent another qualitative shift after the Democrats assumed control of the 110th
Congress. The Democrats offered a governing challenge to the
Bush Administration's management of Iraq. Proportionately less
attention went to purely symbolic legislation-such as condemnations of the doctrine of preemption or censure of American
leaders-and proportionately more attention was devoted to
management issues. Commonly offered resolutions called for a
greater focus on diplomatic relations with neighboring countries
and stabilization policies in Iraq. The language of "redeployment"
was used in thirty-two bills, more than any other category identified in the content analysis. In twenty-four bills, Congress directly challenged President Bush's proposed "surge" of troops in
2007.67 The overall trends in legislative provisions suggest an
increasing seriousness by Congress in taking control of the situation in Iraq.
Once Barack Obama moved into the White House, the volume of proposals attempting to manage the Iraq War from Congress declined. Afghanistan became the focus of the majority in
the small number of antiwar proposals that were introduced, including resolutions to withdraw from Afghanistan or stop President Obama's planned surge there. The 111th Congress was less
insistent about its institutional prerogatives in the war-making
arena than its predecessor had been. The partisan alignment
between the president and Congress was decisive in ending
Democrats' push for peace legislation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Partisanship pervades the congressional politics of war. Parties shape members' preferences on war and guide members' decision making on military policies. Members tend to support the
president's war policies when they are of his party and oppose
those policies when they are of the opposite party. The partisan
composition of Congress influences the introduction of antiwar
legislation, its content, progress, and networks that surround it.
Although the Constitution mandates that Congress and the president share war-making powers, Congress is often willing to de67 For a discussion of the politics of the surge, see generally Peter D. Feaver, The
Right to Be Right: Civil-MilitaryRelations and the Iraq Surge Decision, 35 Intl Sec 87
(2011).
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fer its war-making prerogatives when the president is of the
same party as the congressional majority.
Members of the Democratic Party led the way in building
opposition to the Iraq War in the 107th through 110th Congresses. They leveraged the issue to great effect, helping them to win
control of Congress in 2006 and the Presidency in 2008. Yet,
when the Democrats were finally positioned to make good on
their promises of peace, they abandoned the crusade. This outcome is not just a story of how the Democrats failed to follow
through on a campaign promise. Politicians breaking their campaign promises is very old news to anyone who studies politics.
The notable story is that the Democrats' electoral victories made
it likely that they would subsequently support their president's
military adventures once he inevitably undertook them. The very
nature of polarized partisan politics discourages members of
Congress from scrutinizing the military decisions of their copartisan in the White House.
The power of political parties comes from their ability to coordinate the actions of politicians across multiple institutions
and political contexts. In the case of war and peace, coordination
means deference to the president if he is of the same party. In
light of parties' ability to exert such power, how should opponents of war respond? If winning elections is not enough, what
political tactics are likely to advance the cause of peace?
First, there may be very little that peace advocates can do to
counter the hegemony of political parties. With record levels of
polarization between the two major parties at the mass level and
the elite level in the United States, most political actors and citizens take their cues from parties, especially on issues of war and
peace.68 The president has considerable discretion as the commander in chief of the military, and history shows that he is inclined to use it. When he does, his party members in Congress
and the public tend to support him. Adding to this tendency is
the increasing herd mentality of media and the efforts of politicians to "win the news cycle" each day.6 9 Since any dissention
from the party line constitutes a major news story on any given
day, members of Congress are under strong pressure to stick
with the agenda of their party. While a few rogue Congress
members may break away at any given time, the prospect of a
68 See generally Kriner, After the Rubicon (cited in note 3); Jacobson, 125 Polit Sci Q
31 (cited in note 13); Berinsky, In Time of War(cited in note 50).
69 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution & the
Erosion ofAmerican Democracy 179 (Yale 2005).
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supermajority of members opposing the president to stop military action seems unrealistic.
Second, in order to win short-term victories, peace advocates
have to do more long-term coalition building in Congress. Advocates for peace relied heavily on the internal congressional caucus system for organizing their opposition to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011.70 The Progressive Caucus and
the Out-of-Iraq Caucus were the principal vehicles of this organization most of the time.7 1 On May 18, 2010, John Conyers, Jr (DMI) and twenty-eight other members of Congress formed the
Out-of-Afghanistan Caucus as an additional organizing mechanism to press for peace. 72 However, the membership of these caucuses never exceeded 100 members and, thus, could not sway the
center of gravity of the Democratic Party in Congress. Achieving
victories in the longer term could be aided by building the membership of these caucuses from within Congress, supporting the
election of more sympathetic members to Congress, and creating
a more robust infrastructure for generating policy analysis and
argumentation. By building a progressive majority within the
Democratic Party and assuming key positions of leadership within the party, peace advocates may be able to garner concessions
from a hawkish Democratic White House, even if they do not win
every debate. Alliances across party lines with libertarian and
isolationist Republicans would strengthen this approach even
further.
Third, successful congressional campaigns may be built not
only from within Congress, but also in conjunction with broad
grassroots movements. 73 A sizeable grassroots peace movement
existed between 2003 and 2006, but its close ties with the Democratic Party led it to collapse after the Democrats achieved electoral success in 2006 and 2008, much the same as happened with

70 For a discussion of the political role of congressional caucuses, see generally Susan
Webb Hammond, Congressional Caucuses in National Policy Making (John Hopkins
1998).
71 Author's interview with Bill Goold, Executive Director of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, United States House of Representatives, in Washington, DC (June 20,
2008) (on file with author); Author's interview with Representative Lynn Woolsey, United
States House of Representatives, in Washington, DC (June 26, 2008) (on file with author).
72 John Conyers, Jr., Out of Afghanistan Caucus, online at http/conyers.house.gov/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.Home&Issue id=falc 6 003-19b9-b4bl-12a8-2ae6f 1546bd5
(visited Sept 11, 2011).
73 Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion & Interest Group Strategies 3
(Princeton 1998); Kenneth M. Goldstein, Interest Groups,Lobbying, and Participationin
America 3 (Cambridge 1999).
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Democratic antiwar legislation in Congress. 74 In order to achieve
sustained influence, movements must structure their opposition
in a way that is orthogonal to the party system.75 To do so, they
must cultivate supporters among both major political parties and
independents, as well as from among the myriad demographic
constituencies that oppose war (for example, African Americans,
Latinos). Greater emphasis on communicating policy expertise
and facts to those broad publics would make it more difficult for
politicians of either party to ignore public pressure.
The power of political parties on questions of war and peace
is not immutable, but it is deeply integrated into the entire system of American politics and government. Politicians turn to parties because they provide reliable information, electoral coalitions, and opportunities for individual advancement. Individual
citizens turn to parties because they provide reliable cues on how
to interpret ambiguous information in an uncertain political
world. In order to overcome the hegemony of parties, peace advocates must either offer alternative sources of information, coalitions, and opportunities, or they must convince party leaders
that war is not in the interests of the party. Achieving either goal
would be a major political accomplishment and would, no doubt,
be part of a transformation of American politics and government
into something that would be unrecognizable today. At the same
time, achieving these goals would be a considerable step toward
restoring Congress's constitutional role in genuinely sharing
war-making powers with the president.

74 Heaney and Rojas, 16 Mobilization Intl J at 46 (cited in note 8).
75 For a historical accounting of how the Farm Bureau gained influence when it was
able to establish itself as an independent, nonpartisan force, but then lost influence when
it became too closely aligned with the Republican Party, see John Mark Hansen, Gaining
Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981 (Chicago 1991).
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APPENDIX. ANTIWAR LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS,

2001-2011
107th Congress (2001-2003)

H Con Res 473

H Con Res 518

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the importance of the United States working through the United
Nations to assure Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and advance peace and security in the
Persian Gulf region.
Expressing the sense of Congress that the deployment of United States Armed Forces against Iraq without prior specific
authorization by the United Nations Security Council and
specific congressional authorization pursuant to a declaration
of war would constitute a violation of the obligations of the
United States under the United Nations Charter and a violation of the United States Constitution, respectively.

HJ Res 110

Liberation of the Iraqi People Resolution.

HR 2459

To establish a Department of Peace.

HR 2503

Nuclear Disarmament and Economic Conversion Act of 2001.
A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that
the United States should not use force against Iraq, outside of
the existing Rules of Engagement, without specific statutory
authorization or a declaration of war under Article I, Section
8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States.

S Con Res 133

108t Congress (2003-2005)

H Con Res 101

H Con Res 296

H Con Res 392

Expressing the sense of the Congress that Public Law 107-243,
the authorization to use military force against Iraq, is null and
void.
Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the President's $87 billion supplemental appropriation request for the
occupation and reconstruction of Iraq.
Calling for the adoption of a Sensible, Multilateral American
Response to Terrorism ("SMART") Security Platform for the
21st Century.

HJ Res 20

Disavowing the doctrine of preemption.
Expressing the sense of Congress that the Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 should
be repealed.
To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002.

HJ Res 24

Presidential Report on Iraq Resolution of 2003.

HR 1673

To establish a Department of Peace.

HR 2647

Nuclear Disarmament and Economic Conversion Act of 2003.

HR 3132
HR 3616

War Funding Accountability Act of 2003.
Commission on Preemptive Foreign Policy and Military Planning Act.

HR 4825

Excess War Profits Act of 2004.

H Res 141
H Con Res 2
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H Res 260
H Res 629

H Res 640
SJ Res 9

S Res 28

S Res 32

S Res 76

S Res 479

[2011:

Requesting the President to transmit to the House of Representatives not later [than] 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution documents or other materials in the
President's possession relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
Impeaching Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.
Of inquiry requesting that the Secretary of Defense transmit
to the House of Representatives before the expiration of the
14-day period beginning on the date of the adoption of this
resolution any picture, photograph, video, communication, or
report produced in conjunction with any completed Department of Defense investigation conducted by Major General
Antonio M. Taguba relating to allegations of torture or allegations of violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 at Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq or any completed Department of Defense
investigation relating to the abuse or alleged abuse of a prisoner of war or detainee by any civilian contractor working in
Iraq who is employed on behalf of the Department of Defense.
Presidential Report on Iraq Resolution of 2003.
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United Nations weapons inspectors should be given sufficient time
for a thorough assessment of the level of compliance by the
Government of Iraq with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1441 (2002) and that the United States should seek
a United Nations Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force before initiating any offensive military operations against Iraq.
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to
the actions the President should take before any use of military force against Iraq without the broad support of the international community.
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the policy
of preemption, combined with a policy of first use of nuclear
weapons, creates an incentive for the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and is inconsistent with the long-term security of the United States.
A resolution establishing a special committee administered by
the Committee on Governmental Affairs to conduct an investigation involving Halliburton Company and war profiteering,
and other related matters.

109th Congress (2005-2007)

H Con Res 35

H Con Res 197

H Con Res 321

H Con Res 348

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should
develop and implement a plan to begin the immediate withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from Iraq.
Declaring that it is policy of the United States not to enter into
any base agreement with the Government of Iraq that would
lead to a permanent United States military presence in Iraq.
Providing that the new permanent Council of Representatives
of Iraq is encouraged to debate and vote on whether or not a
continued United States military presence in Iraq is desired by
the Government of Iraq.
Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to accomplishing the mission in Iraq.
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Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should
not initiate military action against Iran with respect to its
nuclear program without first obtaining authorization from
Congress.

H Con Res 470

Expressing the sense of Congress that Donald Rumsfeld
should be replaced as Secretary of Defense.

HJ Res 55

Withdrawal of United States Armed Forces From Iraq Resolution of 2005-Homeward Bound.
Requiring the President to submit to Congress a plan for the
withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, and for
other purposes.

HJ Res 70
HJ Res 73

To redeploy US Forces from Iraq.

HR 3760

Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act.

HR 4232

End the War in Iraq Act of 2005.

HR 4853

Excess War Profits Act of 2006.

HR 4983

First Step to Redeployment Act of 2006.

HR 5875

Iraq War Powers Repeal Act of 2006.

H Res 82

Disavowing the doctrine of preemption.
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the
deployment of United States forces in Iraq be terminated immediately.

H Res 571

H Res 635

H Res 636
H Res 637

H Res 990

S 1756

Creating a select committee to investigate the Administration's intent to go to war before congressional authorization,
manipulation of pre-war intelligence, encouraging and countenancing torture, retaliating against critics, and to make recommendations regarding grounds for possible impeachment.
Censuring President George W. Bush for failing to respond to
requests for information concerning allegations that he and
others in his Administration misled Congress and the American people regarding the decision to go to war in Iraq, misstated and manipulated intelligence information regarding the
justification for the war, countenanced torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in Iraq, and permitted inappropriate retaliation against critics of his Administration, for failing to adequately account for specific misstatements he made regarding the war, and for failing to comply with Executive Order 12958.
Censuring Vice President Richard B. Cheney for failing to
respond to requests for information concerning allegations
that he and others in the Administration misled Congress and
the American people regarding the decision to go to war in
Iraq, misstated and manipulated intelligence information
regarding the justification for the war, countenanced torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in
Iraq, and permitted inappropriate retaliation against critics of
the Administration, and for failing to adequately account for
specific misstatements he made regarding the war.
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the
original authorization for use of force against Iraq contained
in Public Law 107-243 is outdated and Congress should vote
on a new use of force resolution that reflects the current situation in Iraq.
Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act.
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S 1993

Strategy for Success in Iraq Act.

S 4049

A bill to provide for the redeployment of United States forces
from Iraq by July 1, 2007.

S Con Res 93

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to accomplishing the mission in Iraq.

SJ Res 33

A joint resolution to provide for a strategy for successfully
empowering a new unity government in Iraq.

SJ Res 36

A joint resolution providing a strategy for stabilizing Iraq and
withdrawing United States troops.

SJ Res 39

A joint resolution to spur a political solution in Iraq and encourage the people of Iraq to provide for their own security
through the redeployment of the United States military forces.
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the President should submit to Congress a report on the time frame for
the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq.

S Res 171

110t Congress (2007-2009)

H Con Res 23

H Con Res 33

H Con Res 46

H Con Res 63

H Con Res 65

H Con Res 110

H Con Res 201

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should
not order an escalation in the total number of members of the
United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq.
Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should
not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining
authorization from Congress.
Declaring that it is the policy of the United States not to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of
providing for the permanent stationing of United States
Armed Forces in Iraq and not to exercise United States control
of the oil resources of Iraq.
Disapproving of the decision of the President announced on
January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.
Disagreeing with the plan announced by the President on
January 10, 2007, to increase by more than 20,000 the number
of United States combat troops in Iraq, and urging the President instead to consider options and alternatives for achieving
success in Iraq.
Expressing the sense of Congress that Iraq should vote to
approve or disapprove the continued deployment of United
States Armed Forces to Iraq and, unless Iraq votes to approve
such continued deployment, the President of the United States
should commence the phased redeployment of United States
Armed Forces from Iraq within 60 days of the Iraqi vote.
Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of Iraq
should schedule a referendum to determine whether or not the
people of Iraq want the Armed Forces of the United States to
be withdrawn from Iraq or to remain in Iraq until order is
restored to the country.
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H Con Res 319
HJ Res 18

HJ Res 64

HR 353

HR 413
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Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of Iraq
should schedule a referendum to determine whether or not the
people of Iraq want the Armed Forces of the United States to
be withdrawn from Iraq or to remain in Iraq until order is
restored to the country.
Recognizing March 19, 2008, as the fifth anniversary of the
Iraq war and urging President George W. Bush to begin an
immediate and safe redeployment of United States Armed
Forces from Iraq.
To redeploy US forces from Iraq.
Clarifying that the use of force against Iran is not authorized
by the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002, any resolution previously adopted, or any
other provision of law.
To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States
forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9,
2007.
To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243) and to require
the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq.

HR 438

To prohibit an escalation in the number of members of the
United States Armed Forces deployed in Iraq.

HR 455
HR 508

Protect the Troops and Bring Them Home Act of 2007.
Bring the Troops Home and Iraq Sovereignty Restoration Act
of 2007.

HR 645

Comprehensive Strategy for Iraq Act of 2007.

HR 663

New Direction for Iraq Act of 2007.

HR 746

Safe and Orderly Withdrawal from Iraq Act.

HR 787

Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007.

HR 808

Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act.

HR 930

Military Success in Iraq And Diplomatic Surge for National
and Political Reconciliation in Iraq Act of 2007.
Enhancing America's Security through Redeployment from
Iraq Act.
Iraq Benchmarks Act.
To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), and for other
purposes.

HR 960
HR 1263
HR 1292
HR 1460

HR 1837

Change the Course in Iraq Act.
To require the President to develop a plan containing dates
certain for the commencement and completion of a phased
redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, and
for other purposes.

HR 2031

To safely redeploy United States troops from Iraq.

HR 2062

Iraq Troop Protection and Reduction Act of 2007.

HR 2237

To provide for the redeployment of United States Armed Forees and defense contractors from Iraq.
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HR 2450

To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243).

HR 2451

To provide for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces and defense contractors from Iraq.
National Guard Redeployment and Homeland Protection Act of
2007.
Iraq Study Group Recommendations Implementation Act of
2007.

HR 2539
HR 2574
HR 2605

HR 2929

Sunset of Public Law 107-243 Act of 2007.
To limit the use of funds to establish any military installation
or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq or to exercise United States economic control of the oil resources of Iraq.

HR 2956

Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act.

HR 3071

Iraq Redeployment and Regional Security Act.

HR 3125

Opt Out of Iraq War Act of 2007.

HR 3178

To limit the length of deployment of members of the Armed
Forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

HR 3190

Opt Out of Iraq War Act of 2007.
Enhancing America's Security through Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act.

HR 3863
HR 3938
HR 4156

HR 5128

HR 5499

Bring Our Troops Home Responsibly Act of 2007.
Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations
Act, 2008.
Disapproving of any formal agreement emerging from the
"Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of
Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and
the United States of America" unless the agreement is approved through an Act of Congress.
Iraq Redeployment Timetable and Political Reconciliation Act
of 2008.

HR 5507

Fully-Funded United States Military Redeployment and Sovereignty of Iraq Restoration Act of 2008.

HR 5626

Protect Our Troops and Our Constitution Act of 2008.

H Res 23

Disavowing the doctrine of preemption.

H Res 41

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an
increase in number of members of the United States Forces
deployed in Iraq is the wrong course of action and that a drastic shift in the political and diplomatic strategy of the United
States is needed to help secure and stabilize Iraq.

H Res 333

Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United
States, for high crimes and misdemeanors.

H Res 625

Censuring the President and Vice President.

H Res 799

Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United
States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.
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Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the
current economic slowdown in the United States is directly
related to the enormous costs of the ongoing occupation of
Iraq, consigning the United States to what can only be called
the Iraq recession, and for other purposes.
Calling on the President of the United States not to commit
the United States to any status of forces agreement or any
other bilateral agreement with the Republic of Iraq that involves the continued presence of the United States Armed
Forces in Iraq unless the agreement includes a provision under which the Republic of Iraq agrees to reimburse the United
States for all costs incurred by the United States related to the
presence of United States Armed Forces in Iraq after the effective date of the agreement.
A bill to provide for the redeployment of United States forces
from Iraq.
A bill to safely redeploy United States troops from Iraq.
Iraq Study Group Recommendations Implementation Act of
2007.

S 233

A bill to prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United
States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of
January 9, 2007.

S 287

A bill to prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United
States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of
January 9, 2007.

S 308

A bill to prohibit an escalation in United States military forces
in Iraq without prior authorization by Congress.

S 433

Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007.

S448

Iraq Redeployment Act of 2007.

S470

A bill to express the sense of Congress on Iraq.

S574

A bill to express the sense of Congress on Iraq.

S 670

Iraq Troop Protection and Reduction Act of 2007.
A bill to provide a comprehensive strategy for stabilizing Iraq
and redeploying United States troops from Iraq within one

S 679

year.
A bill to provide for the safe redeployment of United States

S 2633

troops from Iraq.
A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that

S Con Res 13
S Con Res 2
S Con Res 4
S Con Res 7

SJ Res 3

the President should not initiate military action against Iran
without first obtaining authorization from Congress.
A concurrent resolution expressing the bipartisan resolution
on Iraq.
A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on
Iraq.

A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on
Iraq.
A joint resolution to specify an expiration date for the authorization of use of military force under the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and to authorize the continuing presence of United States forces in Iraq
after that date for certain military operations and activities
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SJ Res 15

United States Policy in Iraq Resolution of 2007.

SJ Res 9

United States Policy in Iraq Resolution of 2007.

S Res 302

A resolution censuring the President and Vice President.

1 1 1th
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Congress (2009-2011)

H Con Res 248

H Con Res 301

Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces
from Afghanistan.
Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces
from Pakistan.

HR 66

Military Success in Iraq and Diplomatic Surge for National
and Political Reconciliation in Iraq Act of 2009.

HR 1052

Ensuring Military Readiness Through Stability and Predictability Deployment Policy Act.
To require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress outlining the United States' exit strategy for United
States military forces in Afghanistan participating in Operation Enduring Freedom.

HR 2404
HR 3699

To prohibit any increase in the number of members of the
United States Armed Forces serving in Afghanistan.

HR 5015

To require a plan for the safe, orderly, and expeditious redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan.

HR 5353

War is Making You Poor Act.

HR 6045

Responsible End to the War in Afghanistan Act.

H Res 417

S 3197

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that
President Barack Obama should immediately work to reverse
damaging and illegal actions taken by the Bush/Cheney Administration and collaborate with Congress to proactively
prevent any further abuses of executive branch power.
A bill to require a plan for the safe, orderly, and expeditious
redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan.

